The existence of a thermodynamic arrow of time in the present universe implies that the initial state of the observable portion of our universe at (or near) the "big bang" must have been very "special". We argue that it is not plausible that these special initial conditions have a dynamical origin.
There is no question that our present universe displays a thermodynamic arrow of time:
We all have observed phenomena in our everyday lives where entropy is seen to increase significantly, but no one has ever reliably reported an observation of entropy decrease in a macroscopic system. This fact raises a number of obvious questions. Some of these questions have straightforward answers-although they largely "beg the question":
• Question: Why is there a thermodynamic arrow of time in the present universe?
• Answer: Because the present entropy of the universe is very low compared with how high it could be. It is well understood that during the normal course of dynamical evolution, an isolated system will spend the overwhelming majority of its time in a state of (nearly) maximum entropy. Therefore, if we find a system to be in a state of low entropy, it is overwhelmingly likely that we will observe it to evolve to a state of higher entropy. The probability of observing it to evolve to a state of lower entropy is vanishingly small.
• Question: Why is the entropy of the present universe low?
• Answer: Because in the past, the entropy was even lower than it is now. Although the entropy has been increasing with time, it has not had time to reach (or even come very close to) a state of maximum entropy. This explains why it is still low today. In other words, the entropy of the present universe is low because it was much lower a billion years ago; it was very low a billion years ago because it was even lower than that two billion years ago, etc. Clearly, this line of reasoning leads us back to (or, at least, very near to) the "big bang": The reason why the entropy of the present universe is low is that the entropy of the universe at or near the "big bang" was extremely low [1] .
The above claim that the entropy of the very early universe must have been extremely low might appear to blatantly contradict the "standard model" of cosmology: There is overwhelmingly strong reason to believe that in the early universe, matter was (very nearly) uniformly distributed and (very nearly) in thermal equilibrium at uniform temperature. Doesn't this correspond to a state of (very nearly) maximum entropy, not a state of low entropy? In fact, for a system subject only to short-range forces as usually considered in textbooks, in a state of maximum entropy, matter would be homogeneously distributed and at uniform temperature. But, the situation changes dramatically when an unscreened, long-range force such as gravity is present. Even in Newtonian gravity, for a sufficiently large system, the entropy can always be increased by clumping the system and using the binding energy that is thereby released to heat up the system. In Newtonian gravity, this phenomenon is usually referred to as "Jeans' instability" or "gravithermal instability". For point particles in Newtonian gravity, there is no bound to the binding energy, and an isolated, self-gravitating system will simply become more and more clumpy with time. General relativity effectively provides a cutoff to this process via the formation of black holes. Nevertheless, in general relativity, for a sufficiently large system, the state of maximum entropy will not correspond to a homogeneous distribution of matter but rather will contain a large black hole. The entropy of this black hole (as given by the Bekenstein-Hawking formula) will be enormously greater than a state at the same energy and volume where matter is distributed homogeneously. In this way, it can be understood that the early universe was in a state of extremely low entropy compared with how high it's entropy could have been [1] .
Before proceeding further, I should add some caveats to the above discussion. The arguments that underlie our understanding of statistical physics and thermodynamics are based upon having a time translationally invariant system whose dynamics are "ergodic" to a suitable degree. Such arguments certainly do not apply straightforwardly to general relativistic systems. In particular, although general relativistic systems are diffeomorphism covariant, they are not "time translation invariant" in the sense required to apply the usual arguments of statistical physics. Furthermore, in a cosmological setting it seems clear that dynamics cannot, in any sense, be "ergodic": In what sense could an open universe that expands forever (or a closed universe that recollapses within finite time) be said to "sample" a suitably large portion of its allowed phase space? Finally, general relativity is a classical field theory and, as such, would not be expected to have a sensible thermodynamics in any case (for the same reason as classical electromagnetism suffers from the "ultraviolet catastrophe");
we should need to have a quantum theory of gravity and a complete understanding of all of its fundamental degrees of freedom before one could hope to obtain a full understanding of the thermodynamic behavior of gravity. For all of the above reasons, there does not presently exist a general notion of "gravitational entropy", and one should exercise considerable caution when applying thermodynamic arguments to general relativistic systems, such as the entire universe. In particular, recalling that for a closed universe in general relativity there is no meaningful notion of the "total energy of the universe", I see no reason to expect that there will be a meaningful notion of the "total entropy of the universe". Nevertheless, there is very strong encouragement from all of the remarkable results obtained in black hole thermodynamics (see, e.g., [2] ) that in (quantum) general relativity, some notion of entropy will exist and the basic form of the laws of thermodynamics will survive. On account of this, I am reasonably confident that the essential content of the assertions and arguments of the preceding paragraphs will also survive in some form.
The answers to the first two questions above lead us to the following question:
• Question: What caused the very early universe to be in a very low entropy state?
Here I do not have a simple answer to propose. But it would seem that, logically, there are two basic ways to try to account for why the initial state of the very early universe was so "special": (i) The initial state of the universe was, in fact, "completely random". However, dynamical evolutionary behavior was then responsible for making (at least our portion of) the universe be "very special". (ii) The universe simply came into existence in a very special state.
Viewpoint (i) appears to be presently favored by the overwhelming majority of cosmologists. It is usually taken for granted that the universe must have come into existence in a "random state", as though there were a "dartboard of initial conditions", and the actual initial conditions of our universe were selected by the throw of an unskilled and blindfolded creator. Perhaps the best developed and most popular of the ideas for producing a universe like the one that we see from random initial conditions is chaotic inflation. Here, one postulates the existence of a scalar field (the "inflaton") with suitable properties. With random initial conditions for the metric and scalar field, most portions of the universe should recollapse or expand to emptyness on a timescale of the order of the Planck time. However, there also should, by chance, exist regions of sufficiently large size in which conditions are right for the onset of inflation. These regions would then expand exponentially for many e-folding times, so that they would dominate the volume of the universe. Within each inflated region, the universe would be extremely homogeneous and isotropic (and extremely spatially flat), with the only significant deviations from homogeneity and isotropy being those produced by quantum fluctuations. These quantum fluctuations would then result in observable deviations from isotropy in the microwave background and provide the seeds for the formation of the structure observed in the present universe.
Inflationary models are extremely successful in predicting the kind of deviations from homogeneity and anisotropy that we observe in our universe. Indeed, it is quite difficult to come up with alternative models that so naturally produce Gaussian fluctuations of the correct amplitude and "scale-free" spectrum [3] . However, I do not believe that inflationary models-or, for that matter, any other dynamical mechanism-can provide a satisfactory answer to the above question as to why (a suitably large portion of) the very early universe was in such a "special" state, and I therefore also do not believe that inflation can provide a satisfactory explanation for the origin of the thermodynamic arrow of time 1 . My unhappiness with attempts to use inflation or any other dynamical mechanism to try to account for our observable universe being in very special state despite it's having started in a random/generic state can be seen as follows. In essence, in order to dynamically evolve from an assumed "random" initial state to the kind of very "special" state we observe, it is necessary to invoke rare and/or highly unlikely events. For example, in chaotic inflation, the initial conditions needed to produce an inflating patch in the early universe are very "special"; most regions would not inflate and would not evolve to a universe that looks anything like ours. Of course, it is true that, nevertheless, some regions are bound to inflate. Indeed, if the universe is infinite, the probability of having an inflating patch (and, indeed, infinitely many such patches) is 1. Thus, there is no difficulty in arguing that it is possible that the portion of the universe that we observe arose from an inflating patch as described in the chaotic inflation scenario. But in an infinite universe starting with "random" initial conditions, the probability of having a hugh patch that directly evolves-without inflation-to a region indistinguishable from the observed universe also is 1 (as is the probability of producing a universe indistinguishable from ours except that all elephants wear pink dresses), so it also is possible that the portion of the universe that we observe arose in this manner. In order for the chaotic inflationary scenario or other dynamical mechanisms to do better than this, it is necessary to argue that, within the context of the model, observers in the universe are likely to see a universe like the one we see; the presently observed universe should not merely be a (highly unlikely) possibility that is allowed in the model but rather should be a prediction of the model. Unfortunately, as I now shall argue, it appears inevitable that the attempt to make predictions within the context of models of this sort leads one down an essentially circular path, with little, if any, possibility of attaining any explanatory power. In order to predict what an observer should see, one must modulate the probabilities of the various possible cosmological occurrences by the "selection effect" that any observed portion of the universe must contain conscious life in order to be observed. This modulation of probabilities is usually referred to as the "anthropic principle". Now, the probabilities of various cosmological occurences-such as the probability that a given patch will inflate-are already extremely difficult to estimate: We have, at best, only a vague notion of what we mean by "random" or "generic" initial conditions; we know very little about the true physical processes that may have occurred in the very early universe; and, in any case, the probabilities of rare occurrences are notoriously difficult to estimate (since rare occurrences often do not arise in "expected" ways). However, our ignorance of the probabilities of various cosmological occurrences is truly dwarfed by our (nearly) total ignorance of the probability of the existence of observers, since we know virtually nothing about what is really required to produce conscious life. Therefore, it is usual practice in such arguments to substitute the requirement that the observed portion of the universe contain observers with the requirement that the observed portion of the universe have some key features like ours, such as the presence of stars and galaxies. (Obviously, in making such a substitution, one is effectively assuming that the only way-or, at least, the most probable way-of producing conscious life is by following a route very similar to ours; I, personally, do not find this assumption to be plausible.) But then, logically, the only "prediction" being made is the determination of the probability of having a region of the universe that is similar to the observed universe subject to the constraint that this region possess certain key features that are known to be present in the observed universe. Even if the calculation of this probability could be reliably done, I fail to see what one would learn from it. In particular, I fail to see in what sense it would provide an "explanation" of why the observable universe is in the state we find it to be in.
It seems to me to be far more plausible that the answer to the above question as to why the very early universe was in a very low entropy state is that it came into existence in a very special state. Of course, this answer begs the question, since one would then want to know why it came into existence in a very special state, i.e., what principle or law governed its creation. I definitely do not have an answer to this question. But I believe that it will be more fruitful to seek an answer to this question than to attempt to pursue dynamical explanations.
